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Summary findings
The 1992 Czechoslovakia  mass  privatization program  cxpect that two firms  with different shareholding
involving  about 1,500 enterprises  and implemented  structures, but otherwise  identical, would trade at
through a voucher scheme with competitive  bidding was  different prices  - with the firm with a more
a bold step in changing the ownership and governance  of  concentrated ownership, and presumably better
a large part of thc r._onomy.  It represents a clear  test  case  corporate governance,  trading at a higher price. On a
of one approach, and other countries may benefit from  cross-sectional  basis,  ownership structure may thus be
its lessons.  significant  in explaining (relative)  share prices.
At the time, much skepticism  was voiced about mass  Claessens  explores this line of reasoning. Controlling
privatization: it would lead to diffuse ownership,  and no  for a number of firm and sector-specific  variables,  he
effective  corporate governance  would result. But  finds  that:
innovative  forces led to the emergence  of investment  * Majority ownership by a domestic  or foreign
funds that collected much of the individuals voucher  investor has a positive influence  on firm prices.
points, leading to a much more concentrated ownership  *  Firms  with many smnall  owners have lower prices.
structure. It has been expected that this concentrated  - Ownership by many small-scale  investors makes  it
ownership would lead to improved corporate  easier for any single investor to establish  effective
governance,  control, but such control does not necessarily  translate
But the jury is still out. So far, only limited and largely  into higher prices.
anecdotal evidence is available  on the impact investment  Claessens  provides two possible explanations  of why
funds have on the way firms are being managed.  Too  higher prices appear to be associated only  with majority
little tirne has passed and too many shocks  have occurred  ownership  by a single  investor:
(for example, the split of the Czech and Slovak  - The corporate legal framework and the difficulty  in
Republics)  to expect to find discernible changes in  collecting  proxy votes in the Czech and Slovak  Republics
corporate governance on measures  of actual firm  may prevent a small investor from making the necessary
performance.  changes in the way firms are managed,  thus keeping
An alternative approach is to investigate  whether firms  prices low.
that ended up with more concentrated ownership - and  *  Commercial  banks are both managers of investment
possibly  improved governance  - sell for higher prices,  funds and creditors of individual firms. Funds managers
either in the last voucher round or in the secondary  may face conflicts  of interest and not be interested in
market since  then. In a forward-looking  financial  market,  increasing  the value of equity  alone but also the value of
one can expect prices to incorporate the effects  of better  credits. This could explain why prices are relatively
ownership on future firm performance and associated  lower for those firms in which investrnent  funds have
dividends  to shareholders. Put differently, one would  effective  control.
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Much has been written on the need for more effective corporate governance of firms in
Eastern-Europe.  Various schemes for privatizing state enterprises have been put forward to
achieve this goal.  The Czechoslovakia mass privatization program,  implemented through a
voucher scheme  with competitive bidding,  was a  bold step at changing the ownership and
governance of a  large part of the economy.  As such, it represents a clear test case of one
approach and other countries may benefit from any lessons one can draw from it.
At  the time, much skepticism was voiced about mass privatization: it would lead to
diffuse ownership and no  effective corporate governance would result.  Innovative forces,
however, led to the emergence of investment funds which collected much of the imdividuals'
voucher points, leading to a much more concentrated shareholding.  The expectation has since
been that this concentrated ownership will lead to improved corporate governance.  The juxy is
still out, however.  So far, only limited and largely anecdotal  evidence is available on the impact
investment funds have had on the way firms are managed (see Anderson, 1994 and Mejstrik et
al.,  1994 for some examples).  Too little time has passed and too many shocks have octurred
(e.g., the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics) to (yet) expect to be able to find a discemable
effect of changes in corporate governance on measures of actual firm performance.
An  altex  -ative  approach is to  investigate whether firms which ended up  with  more
concentrated ownership  sell for  higher prices,  either  in  the  last  voucher  round  or  in  the
secondary market since then.  In a forward-looking financial market, one can expect prices to
incorporate the effects of better ownership on future firm performance.  Put differently, one
would expect That  two firms with different share-holding  structures, but otherwise identical, to
trade at different prices,  with the firm with a more concentrated ownership and presumably
better corporate governance at a higher price.  On a cross-sectional basis, ownership structure
may thus be a significant factor in explaining (relative) share prices.
This paper explores this line of reasoning.  It relates various indicators of the natre  and
concentration of ownership to the last bidding round prices and the secondary prices on the
Prague  Stock Exchange and  the  so-called RM-system.  The empirical  results  support  the
hypothesis that concentration and prices are positively associated on a cross-sectional basis.
Controlling for a number of firm and sector specific-variables,  I find that the higher the equity
share of strategic owners and the lower the dispersion of ownership, the higher the price.  While
many small owners and high dispersion make it easier for any single investor to  establish
effective control, such control is, however, not always associated with higher prices.  It appears
that  only  absolute control-majority  share  ownership-results  in  higher  prices,  perhaps  a
reflection of legal and corporate restrictions aimed at protecting minority shareholders and the
difficulty in collecting proxy votes, or of conflicts of interests as some commercial banks are
both managers of investment funds and creditors of individual firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  First,  I discuss the voucher scheme and
resulting prices and ownership patterns, as well as the other firm-data I use.  Next, I describe
the link between ownership patterns and prices and develop the basic model to be tested.  The
third section then presents the results, while the conclusions  are su  ed  in the last section.2
1.  The Voucher Scheme, Resulting Ownership  and Prices
Voucher Scheme Anderson (1994), Shafik (1994a), Mejstrik et al. (1994), Triska (1994),
Coffee (1994) and several others describe the mechanisms of the Czech-Slovak voucher scheme
in detail.I  Finns  were selected for privatization and managers had to  submit proposals for
privatization, usually to the founding ministry.  Competing  proposals were also possible.  Only
very limited restructuring was allowed as part of the preparation of a firm for privatization.  A
proposal included the amount of equity of the firm which was to remain with the state, in the
form of temporary or permanent holdings (throug,h  the National Property Fund).2  If a direct
domestic or foreign investor had been identified, then those shares would not be offered either.
The remaining shares were made available through the voucher scheme.
All citizens of 18 years and older bought for a nominal fee of CSK 1035 (equivalent to
about $35, or about 25%  of the average monthly wage) a package of vouchers worth 1000
points.  With these points they could bid for a portion of the shares of 1491 firms on offer, or,
in a pre-bidding "zero'-round,  they could offer (part of) their points to investment funds, which
could then b.  for shares in the voucher scheme.  A large number of these investment funds
emerged on a voluntary basis.  Altogether there were well over 430 funds established at the end
of a  registration period before the bidding rounds started.  Funds were  started by  various
sponsors (domestic and  foreign banks,  corporations and individuals), but  most funds were
sponsored by commercial banks and several banks started more  an  one fund (Mejstrik. 1994
and Coffee, 1994).  Sponsoring involves the establishment  of a management company which
in turn organizes the fund and continues to have a management  contract with the fund.  The
funds are established as joint stock companies and voucher holders are shareholders of the fund,
whose assets are its shares in the firms.
As a result of active marketing campaigns by investment  finds, many individuals offered
all or most of their points to the funds.  Funds ended up owning about 72% and individuals  28%
of the total number of voucher points.  Bank-sponsored  funds acquired the most points.  Egerer
(1994) reports that the 10 largest bank sponsored funds hold 61 % of all points acquired by all
funds (or about 43 % of all points offered through the voucher  scheme).  Looking at the sponsors
of  the funds rather than  the funds themselves, Mejstrik et al. (1994) report  that the top 3
sponsors alone have management contracts with funds which acquired 38% of all points.
Equilibrium voucher prices for each firm emerged through  five sequential bidding rounds.
For  the first round, prizes  (points per  share) were set identically for all  firms.  If demand
matched the supply of shares of particular firm, all shares of that firm were sold in that round.
If a firm's  shares were undersubscribed, those that bid received shares at that price  and the
remaining shares were offered in the next round.  When there was modest excess demand,
citizens were given priority over investment funds and demand of investnent  fands was scaled
'The following  summaiy is largely based on Shafik (1994a).
2For all finms,  3% of shares was set aside to be used for future restitution.3
down however much to clear the market.  Finally, with large excess demand, no shares were
sold and all shares would be on offer again in the next round.  The first round took place on
March  1, 1992 and the last one on December 22,  1992.  Final exchange of shares for points
followed the voucher bidding process.  It did not take place until much later, however, in part
due to the breakup of Czechoslovakia. After the exchange of shares for points was completed,
secondary market trading started at the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) and the so-called RM-
system, a parallel trading system.
Information was made available on each firm covering items such as business activity,
number of employees, output and profit in 1989-91, and prior allocation of shares (to the state,
domestic and foreign investors, etc.).  Investment  funds played a major role in analyzing finns'
prospects on the basis of  this and other information.  Through the mechanism of sequential
bidding  rounds,  much  of  this  information gathering and  analysis of  firms'  prospects was
reflected in the final prices (see further Shafik, 1994b).
Ownership The final ownership structure of the  1491 finms which emerged from the
voucher scheme is desciibed  in Mejstrik et al. (1994).  Table 1 provides the mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum for the shares held by the five investor classes at the end of
the  bidding  rounds:  the  state  (summing several classes,  states) 3,  investment fimds (ipfs),
domestic strategic investors (dominv) and foreign strategic investors (frnginv), and individuals
(idvs).  The mean share of the  state is 8.37%.  Domestic and foreign direct investors own
respectively 3.25% and 1.34% on average.  The low average for direct domestic and foreign
investors and the state reflects the fact that most of firms were majo-ritY  privatized through the
voucher method.
The IPFs average equity share is 39.39%.  The top 10 investment funds (topl_10) own
on  average 38.36%  of  shares,  close to  the  average share  owned by  all- funds combined,
consistent with the fact that the top  10 funds own about 72% of all points that were allocated
to funds (Mejstrik  et al, 1994).  (Shafik 1994a and Mejstrik et al. 1994b also report that, while
the investment funds acquired about 72% of the voucher points, the funds ended up owning a
slightly lower fraction of shares on offer as they bid for more expensive  firms.)  Individuals own
on average 36.53 % of a given firm, slightly less than the average shares for all funds combined.
In aggregate, the investment funds hold much more shares than households, however.  This
implies that individuals preferred to use their vouchers to acquire equity of smaller firms, in
which they established a relatively larger equity stake.  On average, about 1  1  % of equity was
not sold (this share is subsequently summed with state).
Across firms,  ownership is quite varied, as the  respective minimum, maximum and
standard deviations in Table 1 show.  The greatest range is for shares held by all individuals
combined, followed by shares held by investment  funds combined.  The shares for these investor
classes vary between close to 0% and 100%.  For direct domestic and foreign investors and the
3Shares held by the National Property Fund (through permanent, temporary and restimution  share holdings),
shares to be transferred to municipalities, and shares to be sold through banks.4
state, shares vary between 0% and 84%.  The correlations between the relative shareholdings
of the various classes  are all negative, suggesting that these classes are  indeed separate and
economically meaningful different owners.
Detailed data  on  ownership of  individual firns  by  investment funds is provided in
Mejstrik et al. (1994).  The Czech and Slovak Republic Company and Investment Funds Acts
restrict the investment funds from owning more than 20% of the equity of a given firm (see
Coffee, 1994).4  It appears that this constraint is only mildly enforced in practice.  Orenstein
(1994)  reports,  for  example, that  several investment funds  in  Slovakia exceed this  limit.
Nevertheless, a single fund is unlikely to have an absolute majority (more than 50%) stake in
a given company.  Analysis by Mejstrik et al. (1994) confirms this: for none of the 949 firms
they analyze has any single fund more  an  40% of equity and only for 9 firms has a single fund
more than 30%.  Analyzing the larger group of investment fund holdings in 1491 Czech and
Slovak firms, I find a similar result.  The highest share of a single firm's equity owned by a
single fund (top))  is 32.44%, and for only two firms does a single fund own more than 30%
(Table 1).
Effective Control The effective control a given investor may have over a fim  depends
not only on the fraction of the shares she owns, but also on the distribution of the shares of other
owners.  In an extreme case, an investor with only a very small fraction of shares, e.g.,  10%,
could have effective control over the firm if the rest of the shares were widely-distributed  among
the firm's remaining shareholders who do not collude.  Mejstrik et al. (1994) analyze then also
the degree of effective ownership for a sample of 919 firms.  They do this by calculating the
ownership of each investor relative to the overall ownership of  18 strategic investors. 5 They
define a situation of effective control as a  case where the equity held by a single strategic
investor is more than 50% of the equity held by all (18) strategic investors.  They find that one
single fund can  control  146 fims,  two funds 473  firms and  three funds 669 firms.  This
indicates that the funds could have much more effective  control than their nominal shareholdings
suggest.
Extending this approach to the larger sample of 1491 Czech and Slovak firms and using
four  strategic  investor  classes  (the state,  domestic and  foreign  investors, and  the  top  10
investment funds  for a given  fimn), indicates that one single fund could control 273 firms
(controldl),  two funds 739 firms (controld2) and three funds 1013 firms (controld3, Table 2).
In other words, for about half of the firms, two investment funds effectively control the firm (of
course, these are not the same two funds for all firms).  When all shares held by the state are
'To prevent evasion through the use of multiple funds controlled by the same investment company, a further
restriction is that the assets of all investment funds established  by a single, individual investment company cannot
represent more than 20% of the shares of the same issuer.
5They define the 18 strategic investors as direct domestic or foreign investors, the National Property Fund
(through temporary, permanent, and restitution share holdings), shares to be transferred to municipalities,  shares
to be sold through banks, shares not (yet) sold, and the top 10 investment funds for the firm in question.5
summed, the state could have effective control of 152 firnms  (controls). For another 100 either
a domestic or foreign direct investor has control (controld and contro1j'). Combining the frms
in which either two ftuds, one domestic, one foreign investor, or the state could effectively  have
control,  I find  992 fuins  or 67% of  all firms,  with effective control by one party or  two
investment  funds (relctrt).  The large fraction of firms in which there is effective control by one
(or two) investors indicates that nominal  shareholding--on  average, these investors combined own
only 51% (nonwide in Table 2)--is not necessarily a good indicator of effective control."
Dispersion  A useful measure of the degree of ownership dispersion is the Herfindahl
index (the sum of squared ownership shares). 7 This index, H, takes on the value of one if the
firm is wholly owned by one single investor.  If ownership is exactly equally distributed among
all shareholders, then H will be the mean equity share held.  For any other distribution of
ownership, the index will be in between, with more dispersed ownership closer to the mean and
less dispersed closer to one.  In calculating  the indicawr H here, I use the same five shareholder
classes for each individual firm (the state, the domestic and foreign investors, the investment
funds, ail  individuals, where I include the shares not sold with those held by the state).  The
share held by any individual is set to zero for the calculation of H as any single individual owns
only a marginally small amount of a given firm.
Calculating this  indicator for the  1491 firms,  I  find  that  the mean H-indicator  of
dispersion is 14%, with a low close to 0% and a high of 87%, and a standard deviation of 13%
(Table 2).  A similar index for dispersion among the funds only (scaled, such that when one
fund owns all fund shares, the index is one) has a mean of 33%, with a low of 7% and a high
of 100%, and a standard deviation of 23 %.  Relatively speaking, ownership of the average firm
among funds is thus more concentrated, consistent with the fact that the top ten funds acquired
three-quarter of all voucher points.
A disadvantage of the H-index is that it does not consider the total amount of share-
ownership by  strategic investors.  For  example,  if there are  four strategic owners owning
together 100% in all equal (25%) shares, then H will be the same as when one strategic owner
owns 50%,  with the  rest widely distributed. 8 The second fim  may, however,  have more
6Actually, the correlations between the share of equity held and a dummy which is one in case of effective
control is also negative for investment  funds and the statt.  It is positive  for domestic  investors, indicating  that when
they have a stake it tends to be for controlling  purpose.  For foreign investors, the correlation is zero.  Combing
one strategic investor or two funds, the correlation is negative again, consistent with the fact that the smaller the
shares held by all strategic investors combined, the easier it is for any individual  strategic investor (or two funds)
to exercise control.  Among the control dummies, there are no strong correlations (Table 2).
7Cable (1985) uses this index to investigate  some aspects of corporate  control in Germany and its effect on firm
performance.
8Mathematically,  4*(1/4)2 = 1/4, which  is equal to (1/2)7 +  E02 = 1/2, where the share held by each individual
is set to zero.  I also calculate  the equivalent  H-index for dispersion in ownership  among the nonwide  investors only
(which is equal to one if there is only a single nonwide investor, even when there are many individual  investors).6
effective governance than the first.  I therefore also use the share of equity held by all (four)
strategic investors combined (nonwide).  The  average share held by  all strategic  investors
combined is 51  %, with a standard deviation of 23% (Table 2).  The low is close to zero and the
high of 93 %.
The mean equity share held by each of the four classes of strategic shareholders is 51  %14
or 13 percent, about equal to the mean of H,  14%.  As indicated, H will be equal to the mean
equity share held by each class if the shares are equally distributed.  On average, there is thus
an equal distribution of share holdings among the four classes of strategic owners.  But, the
correlation between nonwide and H is relatively low (0.41, Table 2), suggesting that they are
separate indicators of ownership structure.
Prices  I use three kind of prices: the prices of the last (5th) bidding round for both
Czech and Slovak firms,9 and secondary market prices for firms traded on the Prague Stock
Exchange (PSE) and the Czech RM-system.  The voucher prices cover 1469 finns; the number
of fums  for which I have PSE and RM-system prices are much less as they involve only Czech
republic firms.  Since the PSE and RM-system are continuously operating markets (PSE traded
once a week initially, now trades three times a week and is planning to trade five days a week;
and the RM-system traded once a month initially, and now every two weeks), there are many
prices which can be analyzed.  I choose prices from November 30, 1993 for the PSE as on that
date the largest number of shares (338) were traded.'0 For the RM-system, I use the December
10th prices for altogether 714 stocks.
All prices are converted to their logarithms for two reasons.  One, the voucher prices are
not Czech Koruna (CK) prices, but rather shares per point.  There is consequently  a conversion
from the voucher pnces  into CK (RM and PSE) prices  which is uniform across all  stocks.
Using logs allows for the calculation of correlations between voucher and secondary market
prices and makes the regressions for voucher and secondary market prices comparable.  Second,
all three price series have a very fat-tailed distribution when expressed in levels.  In logs the
Using this index instead leads to results qualitatively  similar to those reported below.
9Shafik  (1994b) analyzes the price determination  in the voucher rounds and uses what she calls  fminal  prices."
These are the prices in the 5th round or the earlier prices of those stocks which had already been sold, with the
modification  that stocks which were oversubscribed  in the 5th round and which were not yet sold for more than 50%
are dropped (this implies that in total only 22 of the 1491 stocks offered in the voucher schemes are not included).
I use this final price here too.  I also used two other prices series: 5th round-prices  and modified 5th round-prices,
with the latter defined as the 5th round bidding  prices excluding those 117  enterprises  which were in excess demand
in the 5th round, but including 255 enterprises already sold, mnaking  for  1374 enterprises.  The results are
qualitatively  similar to the ones for the fmal price reported here.
'0The PSE opened with trading on July 13, 1993; prior to October, trading was however limited to about 100
stocks.  Since then the number of stocks traded on the PSE has increased.7
price distribution is closer to a normal one." 1 Table 3 reports the statistics fo' these log prices.
There is a high correlation between the (logs of the) RM/PSE prices on one hand and the
voucher prices (Table 3).  Here the correlations are calculated for the 235 stocks which are
traded on both the RM and the PSE at the end of November/early December and for which there
also is a voucher price.  The correlations between the (log of the) three prices are between 0.72
and 0.90.  As expected, the highest correlation is between the RM and PSE prices as these
prices are only 10 days apart.- 2
Firm Data  In addition to the ownership variables mentioned above, for almost all the
firms which were part of the voucher scheme, I have the following firm-specific variables:
output, profit,  credit, employment (the first three for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991), book
value of equity, total book value of the firm, total liabilities (these for the year 1991 only),
region, city, and branch of industry.  I use these variables or combinations of them to control
for the influence of non-ownership  factors on prices.  I do not have all independent  variables for
all firms for which I have one or more prices.  This is particularly so for the secondary market
prices.  There are, for example, firms which are newly listed on the Prague exchange for which
I do not have data on profits, ownership, etc.  The number of useable observations for the PSE
and RM prices is therefore less than the total available.  In the basic regression, there are only
590 usable observations for the RM-system and 287 for the PSE, compared with 1204 for the
voucher prices.
2.  Corporate  Governance,  Firm  Performance  and Equity Prices
Ideally, one would like to have measures of actual individual  firm performance (including
changes in management) to investigate the influence of corporate governance and distribution
of ownership on the  firm.  Megginson et  al.  (1994), Pinto et al.  (1994), Pinto and  van
Wijnbergen  (1994),  and  Galal et  al.  (1994) pursue  this  approach for  state  and/or  newly
privatized  firns.'3 This  has drawbacks,  however.  First,  performance data  will only  be
available ex-post, often with a considerable lag time.  Also, frnm data in Central and Eastern-
Europe are  of poor quality and international accv-unting  standards are still being introduced.
Second, exogenous shocks can affect firm performance, making it difficult to separate the effect
of ownership.
An alternative approach which deals with some of these drawbacks is to use (publicly
'This was verified using the Jarque-Bera normality test.
1 2The correlations  between the first prices on the RM-system (6118/93)  and the PSE (7/13/93) and the 5th round
prices are even higher: 0.90 and 0.97 respectively.
'Note  that these studies concem themselves only with state or privately-owned firms, and do not study the
effects of ownership distribution  of privately-held firms on firm performance.
l8
traded) share prices.  In a forward-looking market, one can expect prices of firns  to already
incorporate the  effects of changes  in  ownership and  corporate goverance  on  future  fuim
performance.  Put differently, one would expect two firms with different ownership structures,
but otherwise identical, to trade at different prices.  In particular, one would expect that firrns
with more concentrated ownership to trade at higher prices as there is a greater incentive on the
part of owners to monitor the firn  and make the necessary changes in management.  This
approach has, for example, been used by Lease et al. (1984), DeAngelo and DeAngelo  (1985),
and Levy (1983), who find positive relationships bets--een  stock prices and voting power for US
firms.
I expect this cross-sectional relationship  between ownership structure and (relative) share
prices both for the voucher bidding rounds as well as for the secondary market trading.  While
it was not exactly known during the bidding rounds who would ultimately be successful in
acquiring equity ownership in a particular firm, much of it could be inferred, especially by the
investment funds.'4 As the voucher bidding progressed, funds then also adjusted the prices
they were willing to pay for specific firms in light of the ownership pattern emerging from
shares already sold.  And indirectly, individuals acquired this information too (Shafik (1994b)
shows that individuals adjusted their demand (and resulting prices) in response to the demand
by investment funds).
Admittedly, prices may not have been set in a perfectly rational manner in the voucher
bidding rounds.  Investors may have simply followed other investors' strategies in the (perhaps
mistaken) belief that these had better knowledge about the firms'  prospects.  But, unless the
miarket  is assumed to have remained inefficient, mistaken beliefs should have become apparent
quickly and prices  be adjusted to their true values.  Since I use, in addition to the voucher
prices, also secondary market prices of about a year after the last bidding round was closed, any
initial mistaken beliefs would likely have been corrected over this period." 5
The relationship between ownership structure and share  prices  could be negatively
affected by conflicts of interests.  Coffee (1994) extensively discusses this potential for conflict
of  interests in  case of  the Czech investment funds.  As mentioned earlier,  most funds are
sponsored by commercial banks, which themselves are large creditors of the firms in which the
M 4This  was made easier  by the fact that a number  of investment  funds  had made their investment  strategies
known  before  the bidding  rounds  started. For example,  there  was one fund  who  had announced  that it would  buy
a particular  hotel;  and several  funds  specialized  in a particular  sector  or 'country"  (Czech  Republic  or Slovakia),
or emphasized  growth  or dividends. Some  other investment  funds  had either  stated  (e.g., the fund sponsored  by
the Savings  Bank)  or had little  choice-because  of the size  of voutaer points  they  had accumulated  and regulations
restricting  their investment  in any given  company-but  to diversify  their investments  across a large number  of
enterprises  and be a mostly  passive  investor.
'5This is especially  true for the influence  of ownership  variables  since  the final picture of ownership  was
available  when  secondary  market  trading  started. I show below  that, while  voucher  prices  and secondary  market
prices  are closely  related,  ownership  variables  play a much  more  important  role for the secondary  market  prices
than for the voucher  prices.9
funds  hold  equity  >takes. In the bidding  rounds,  the funds'  management  may therefore  also have
had the interests  of the bank as creditor in mind when deciding  in which company  to invest.
This  conflict  of interests  may  have  continued  and influenced  the secondary  market  prices. While
the funds arc joint stock companies,  and thus formally govcrned  by the boards elected at the
annual meeting  of shareholders,  it is likely that individual  shareholders  exerted little indirect
control  ovcr a fund's management.  Li most cases. banks  continue  to be closely  involved  in the
management  of the funds  and reportedly  some  banks  exert much  influence  on the finrs in which
they also are a creditor.
If these conflicts  of interests  happens  on a large scale, secondary  market  prices may be
negatively  influenced,  especially  for a firm with large  ownership  by a single  fund where  the fund
is managed  by a bank to which the firm is also a large debtor.  This effect would imply that
large ownership  by an individual,  bank sponsored  fund could lead to lower prices, keeping
everything  else constant.  In addition, there is the possibility  that managers of the funds,
regardless  of their links to creditor  banks, have poor incentives  to maximize  the final value  to
the fund shareholders. Coffee (1994), for example, mentions  that the permitted  fee structure
may not provide  the best incentive  for the managers  to maximize  the fImns'  current  share prices.
Furthermore,  fund managers  appointed  to the board of a firn are most often paid a fee by the
firm. 16 This potentially  weakens the independence  of the fund manager vis-a-vis the firm.
These  effects  would  go in the opposite  direction  from what  I hypothesize  is the main relationship
between concentration  of ownership  and prices.' 7 As such, it can not lead to me falsely
accepting  the null-hypothesis  that concentrated  ownership  leads  to higher  prices.
An econometric  problem  which  could arise is that the non-ownership  variables  I use, can
not control  for all the characteristics  of a fuim  (e.g., the quality  of its management).  This could
lead to a bias'  in the coefficients  of the other right hand side variables  if the omitted  variable  is
correlated to these variables.  To bias  the coefficients  for the ownership variables--the
coefficients  I am interested  in, the omitted variable(-s)  would have to be correlated to the
structure  of ownership. But, provided  the bidding  process and secondary  market trading are
competitive--which  it appears  to have been, there are no strong a-priori reasons to think that
omitting  variables  could lead to a spurious  correlation  between  the prices of firms and their
ownership  structures. Also, i. the variables  I use are poor proxies  (e.g., the profit-measure  I
use may poorly reflects  true past profitability),  the coefficients  of all variables  can be biased,
unless the proxy is a linear fiunction  of the true variable.  One way I check  for these potential
biases is by performing  robustness  tests on the sign and significance  of the ownership  variables
(reported  below).
"'In case of some funds managed  by banks. the directors appointed to the board of the firms may include bank
employees.
" 7Coffee  also stresses  the large  cross-ownership  among  banks  and insurance  companies  in the Czech  Republic.
The implications  of this concentrated ownership for equity prices are not obvious, however.10
3.  Results
Variables  Finally Used I relate equity prices of individual  finms  to various ownership
concentration variables and other, controlling variables.  Shafik (1994b) and Mejstrik (1994)
have estimated price equations for voucher and PSE prices and provide some suggestions for
right-hand  side variables,  beside  the ownership  variables. I use the ones they report and add
other ones. The following  variables  are significant  in one or more  of the three price series: the
growth rate of output of the firm between 1989 and 1991 (outg), the book value of equity
(bookva), employment  in 1991 (emplo9l), profit in 1991  (profil9l), equity per employment
(equ_ep),  profit  per  output  (pro_out),  employment  per  output (enmp  our),  the  squared
employment rate  (to account for  possible non-linearities,  emplo2), dummies for  sectors
(construction, dumco, and services, dumse), and a dummy for a region (West Bohemia, dumwb).
Shafik (1994b) and Mejstrilc  (1994) already provide possible explanations why these variables
are significant.  Table 4 presents the mean and standard deviation statistics for these variables
as well as the matrix of cross-correlations. Size (bookval and empto9l, which are highly
correlated)  has a negative  effect on prices.  As employment  squared  has a positive sign, it
appears that beyond a certain level, a large labor force tends to increases  prices, perhaps a
reflection  of expected  state  support. Profitability  (profil9l and pro_out)  has a positive  effect,
while high capital intensity (equemp) has a negative  effect.  The fact that emp out has a
positive  effect on shares prices suggests  that high labor intensity  (and low capital  intensity)  is
considered  a comparative  advantage.
The effect of ownership  distribution  on prices  is a complex  one. I therefore  use several
alternative  variables,  including  the variables  already introduced:  the Herfmdahl  index  H and the
share of equity held by the strategic investors (nonwide). In addition,  I use the following
variables:  the percentage  of shares  sold  to foreigners  (frnginv);  the percentage  ofshares sold  to
individual  domestic  investors  (dominv); the shares held by the first most important  investment
funds (topl), the second  most important  (top2); etc. as - 11l  as the sum of the shares of the first
through  nth  most important  fund  (topl_n); and dummies  indicating  whether  a particular  investor,
or n-number  of funds,  or any strategic  investor  has effective  control  (control.).  Obviously,  some
of these variables  are closely  related; for example,  the correlations  between  the shares of the
state and a dummy indicating  its effective control is 0.78; and that between the shares of
domestic  and  foreign  investors  and  dummies  indicating  their  control,  0.87 and 0.89 respectively.
It is consequently  difficult  to the discriminate  between  the effects  of individual  variables. But,
several  correlations  are actually  negative,  for example  between  the equity  share  held by all funds
together  and effective  control  by one or two funds.
Results  Not all variables  are significant  for all three price series, in part due to the high
collinearity  between  some of the firm-variables  (e.g., profit9l and  bookval, 0.92, see Table  4).
Table 5 therefore  only lists the results  for the specifications  for each  price series which  include
the significant  non-ownership  explanatory  variables  and one or more  ownership  variables. The
regressions  have  a good  explanatory  power. For example,  compared  to the results  obtained  by
Shafik (1994b), the regressions  here have better R 2s (the highest is 0.35 versus the highest
reported by Shafik  of 0.10), often with a much smaller number  of right band side variables.11
The fit of the regressions is very similar across the prices series.  As found by Mejstrik et al.
(1994), sector dummies are significant for all equations, but not always the same dummies for
all three price series.
The  influence of  frmn-specific, non-ownership data appears  to  be  much  less  than
previously reported.  Several of the firm-specific variables found to be significant by Shafik
(1994b) and Mejstrik et al. (1994) are no longer significant, e.g.,  the ratio of total liabilities to
equity and the ratio of profit to equity are no longer significant.  This is especially so for the
non-voucher prices.  For the PSE and RM prices, respectively  only two and three frm-specific
variables are significant.'  The fact that more non-ownership variables are significant for the
voucher prices is perhaps to be expected; at that time, no complete information about the final
ownership was available and  non-ownership variables were likely used more extensively to
determine the relative value of firms.
The results for the ownership variables are the following.  The degree of  non-wide
ownership, nonwide, has for all three prices a significant, positive influence.  And, the lower
the dispersion of ownership (the higher H), the higher the price.  The regressions which combine
H and nonwide in one regression, indicate that both have simultaneously  a positive effect for all
three price series.  In other words, higher concentration  tends to have a positive effect on prices
even when controlling for a higher degree of strategic ownership and vice-versa.  But there is
some evidence of collinearity as in case of the PSE and voucher prices, while still positive, H
is no longer statistically significant.  It appears that high strategic ownership (nonwide) is more
important than ownership concentration (H) in terms of its effect on prices.
High ownership by  domestic or foreign strategic investors (dominv and frnginv)  also
exerts a significant positive influence on prices, for all specifications  reported.  As the variable
nonwide is also included, this effect is on top of the positive effect of high ownership by all
strategic investors combined.  The relative effect of domestic and foreign ownership on prices
is simiiar, but there is a slightly higher significance for domestic ownership for most equations.
Effective control by a domestic or foreign strategic investor also exerts a positive influence on
prices (results are not reported).  Controld and controif, dummies which take on the values of
one if the shares of the foreign or domestic investor among nonwide is larger  an  50%,  are
positive  for  all specifications  used  and,  except  for  the PSE  prices,  almost  always  significant.
The relative effect of domestic and foreign control on prices is again similar, but there is also
a  somewhat higher significance for domestic control.  These results suggest that there  are
benefits from a single domestic or  foreign controlling owner over and above the effects of
concentrated and/or large total strategic ownership.
The share of state ownership--states-has consistently a positive and significant influence
on  the voucher price.  For  the other  two price  series, it is mostly positive but not  always
' 1Qualitatively,  the regressions for the RM and PSE prices show similar  results as for the voucher prices when
using  the same  specification,  but not all the same  right hand side variables  are significant.12
significant (not reported).  Effective control by the state--controls,  a dummy which takes on the
value one if the state share as a fraction of nonwide is larger than 50%--has, however, almost
always a negative effect on prices.  Whether or not I control for domestic or foreign strategic
ownership, the  coefficient for  controls is most often negative, and  significantly so,  and  if
positive, rarely significant (not reported).  These two results suggests that having the state as
another owner can be useful, perhaps as it allows for some  beneficial treatment of the firm (e.g.,
favorable credits), 19 but that having the state control the firm is perceived to have a negative
effect on the value of the fimn.
I investigate the effect of ownership by investment funds on prices by including in the
regression the total equity stake of  all funds,  ipfs, for the particular firm.  This  way I also
investigate whether investment  funds perhaps collude, which would imply that not  just the equity
shares of the top investment funds are positively related to the share prices:O0 I find that the
coefficient for the equity share of all investment funds combined is significantly positive (Table
6,  where only the results without nonwide are reported).  This effect is difficult to  separate,
however, from the influence of large strategic ownership in general as there is a relatively high
correlation between nonwide and ipfs, 0.59.
There is a clear tradeoff, however, between nonwide and H on the one hand and effective
control, particular by investment funds, on the other hand. As reported, the lower nonwide, the
easier it is for a given strategic investor--particularly investment funds-to  have a controlling
stake (as it takes a lower share of equity).  I show this by using the dummy relctrl, which is one
for those firms where there is ay  investor (whether the state, domestic, foreign or one or two
investment  funds) which has effective control (defined as a fraction of nonwide larger than 50%).
This dummy has a negative correlation with the share of nonwide, -0.42.  I now use the dummy
relctrl to see whether a controlling stake in itself leads to higher share prices.  Table 7 shows
that,  even when I  control for  nonwide  and H,  the coefficient for reictrl is  negative,  and
significant in  almost all  cases (when controlling  for nonwide alone,  the  coefficient is  not
significant for PSE and RM prices, but still significant for the voucher prices).  It appears that
this result largely arises because the investment finds can establish more easily control when
nonwide is small.  A controli dummy-indicating control by the top 2 investment funds alone--
has then also a correlation of -0.61 with nonwide.  Using controli instead of relctrl, I find that
coniroli explains most  of  the  negative  influence on  prices  of  controlling  ownership  (not
reported).
These  results suggest that high  absolute strategic ownership has a positive effect on
prices, but that effective control, particularly by  investment fimds, does not have a positive
influence on prices--actually a negative influence.  This tradeoff could arise on three accounts:
9'The  fact that for the more recent PSE and RM prices, the coefficient for the share of state ownership is no
longer significant may reflect a revision of this view, at least for the Czech Republic.
"I also used the total equity shares held by the top one through top 'n"  investment  fimd.  The results are very
similar to using ipfs, as these equity shares are highly correlated with ipfs.13
one, legal and corporate by-law restrictions which are aimed at protecting minority shareholders;
two, conflicts of interests;  and three, a poorly functioning secondary market which does not
easily allow an  investor to  increase its equity stake.  I  call the first  the absolute majority
hypothesis,  the  second  the  expropriation hypothesis,  and  the  third  the  secondary  market
hypothesis.
Absolute majonty hypothesis Under the absolute majority hypothesis legal and corporate
by-law restrictions may prevent strategic owners from making radical changes in the way the
firm is managed without consent of  a large fraction of  shareholders.  But, consent may be
difficult to obtain as few small shareholders can or will bother to vote.  This  would prevent
effective control by a small strategic shareholder, even when its share among other strategic
shareholders is large (more than 50%).  A larger, ebsolute majority ownership stake may be thus
necessary to improve corporate governance.
Expropriation Hypothesis  A somewhat opposite situation could occur when residual
shareholders are being diluted by a controlling shareholde: who has also other interests.  In this
case, the controlling, but perhaps not absolutely  large shareholder would have effective control
over the firm-and  may be increasing the overall value of the fum, but the equity price of the
firm is not necessarily higher as firm value is being diverted to the firm's creditors (i.e., banks)
or other parties.  As mentioned, funds are often controlled by banks who are also the major
creditors of the fmns.  Consequently, conflicts of interests more likely exist for investment funds
than for other equity holders.
I do not have data on the debts of each firm to each bank to be able to identify banks
which are at the same time large creditor and sponsor of a fund which has a large equity stake
in the same firm.  I can thus not test the expropriation hypothesis directly.  But, two things are
worth noting.  One, the fact that the negative coefficient  for reictrl reported above largely arises
from investment funds ownership-which are the most likely owners with a conflict of interests,
lends some support to this hypothesis.  Second, the incentive to dilute the interests of residual
shareholders decreases as one's own shareholdings increases, i.e.,  the marginal retum to dilute
declines  as  ownership  increases.  In  this  sense,  the  expropriation  and  absolute  majority
hypotheses go the same direction.
I now venfy  the absolute majority hypothesis by  runming regressions where I use a
dummy for absolute control--equity share greater than 50%--of any of the strategic investors,
absctrl. There is a big difference between the number of firms in which there is one shareholder
(or two funds) with absolute control and the number of firms for which there is one shareholder
(or two funds) with relative control among the strategic shareholders.  With a cutoff of 50%,
for only 89%  of the firms is there a shareholder  with absolute control, versus 67% of the firms
with relative control.  The difference is particularly large for the investments funds.  There is
no firm in which the top two funds have absolute ownership, but for about half of the firms, the
top two funds have a controlling stake among all strategic owners.14
I run the regressions now with absctrl (but without dominv, frnginv, nonwide and H as
these  are  positively correlated  with  absolute control).  The  results are  that  absctrl  has  a
significant, positive sign for all three price series, confirming the absolute majority .Vypothesis
(Table  8).  Since  the  regressions  are  in  log  prices,  the  coefficients for  absctri  indicate
(approximately) the  percentage  increase in prices as  a  result  of crossing the  threshold for
absolute control.  This elasticity is quite high, between 40% and 100% for the three price series.
I next vary in steps of 5 percentage points the ratio of equity held by a single investor
for which I define "absolute control" to occur.  Figure 1 plots the fraction of firms for which
there is an "absolute" controlling shareholder at different cutoff levels of equity owned.  For
lower cutoff levels,  there  are  obviously more fims  for  which there  is a  shareholder  with
"absolute" control.  With  a cutoff of 30%,  about 45% of the  finms has a  shareholder with
"absolute" control.  With a cutoff of 20%, about 80% of furms has an "absolute" controlling
shareholder. Figure 1 also plots the cross-sectional variance in absctrL. It is, as expected, small
for low as weEl  as for high cutoffs ratios: all firms will have an "absolute" owner at a 0% cutoff
and none at 100%, causing the lower cross-sectional variation at the tails.
I  now rerun  the  regressions using  the  different cutoff  levels.  Figure  2  plots  the
coefficients  for the various cutoff levels for the three prices series (I use the same specification
as reported above in Table 8).21 The coefficients for absctrl are significantly positive for all
cutoff ratios.  For cutoff ratios below about 30%, the coefficients for absctrl decline.  At ratios
above 30%,  however,  the  coefficients for  abscrH increase for  all  three  prices  series  and
"absolute" control has a strong positive effect on prices.  The effect levels off for ratios above
60% to an elasticity between 75%  and 125%.  The effect appears to be the strongest for the
voucher prices, followed by the RM and PSE prices.
The fact that the coefficients sharply increase for ratios above 30% could be consistent
with the corporate legal framework in the Czech and Slovak Republics.  Gray (1993) and Gray
and Hanson (1993) report  that the minimum quorum requirement in  the Czech and  Slovak
Republics is 30%  and the  minimum majority  requirements are  generally above  50%  (for
instnce,  more dtan 50% is required to remove directors and supervisors, and a supra-majority
of  66%  is necessary for fundamental changes, such as  an increase or  reduction  in equity,
dissolution of the company, and changes in the company statutes).  At the same time, funds are
prohibited from owning more than 20% of a firm's shares.  Individual funds may thus lack the
ability to make fundamental changes.
2 "With  domimv  and  fnginv included  the coefficients  for  abscri are  generally  still  positive  and mosdy  significant,
and show a similar pattem in case of the voucher  and RM prices, but less so for the PSE prices.  With both
nonwide  and H included,  abscni is most often  not significant  and its coefficient  fluctuates  between  positive  and
negative  values.
221t  is intesting  to note  that in the Fall of 1994,  the head  of the Czech  National  Property Fund  proposed  to
abolish  all limits  on fund ownership,  so that a fund  could  own 100%  in a single  enterprise. Apparently,  this led
to no changes,  however, At the opposite,  the Ministry  of Finance  appears  to be enforcing  now the 20%-rule,15
In general,  a small  ownership  stake need  not weaken  the power of a relative  controlling
shareholder  even in the presence  of high majority  requirements.  In Germany,  for example,  the
proxy process  tends to support  the creditor  banks  of the firm, which themselves  are most  often
minority  equity holders. German  banks effectively  hold the proxy votes of small  shareholders
and they can use these if a larger absolute  majority  is necessary. In the US, by contrast,  access
to shareholder  lists tends to be controlled  by managers  and the proxy process thus tends to
support  incumbent  management.  Since the custodial  and  proxy  voting  systems  are likely  not yet
well developed  in the Czech and Slovak Republics,  passive  shareholders' votes  are essentially
lost to either minority shareholders  or managers.  Tie regression results here suggest  that
this is to the detriment  of all shareholders  as the value  of the firm is lower.
Secondary  market  hypothesis I next verify  the secondary  market  hypothesis  by rnning
(for the PSE-prices  only)  regressions  which include  the relative  amount  of trading  which  occurs
in each stock.  I use the (log of the) ratio of volume  (number) of stocks traded relative to
original  book value as our measure  of turnover. 24 I expect  that this liquidity  measure  will have
a positive  influence  on prices  for two reasons:  one, it will  lower  bid-ask  spreads  and the required
rates  of return, thus raising  stock prices; and two, it will make  it easier for a given investor  to
build up a controlling  stake in a firm.  The first effect  would show up as a positive  sign for
turnover in the regressions.  The second effect would imply a lower importance  of reictrl
(relative to not having turnover included), as having a relative controlling stake currently
becomes  less relevant.
Table 9 reports the result when  using the same  right hand side variables  as in the basic
regression.25  The results  of the right two panels  confirm  the first effect as the sign  for turnover
is positive. Regarding  the second  effect, the importance  of relctrl is not affected,  however,  by
the inclusion  of turnover  and it still maintains  a negative  sign  (middle  column)  which  is not less
than that for the basic regression  (left column). This is true for all specifications. It thus
appears  that an inability  to acquire more stocks  due to a lack of liquidity  does not explain the
negative  sign for relctrl.
something  it was not doing very strictly earlier.
23An anecdote  can illustrate this.  For its first General Assembly  meeting, the Czech Savings Banks  had rented
a  sports  stadium to  accormmodate  its  about  80,000,  mostly individual shareholders.  Supposedly, only  12
shareholders, mostly representatives of investment funds, attended the meeting.
24As  I use the PSE-prices as of November 30, 1 use the average of the daily volume traded prior to that date.
2sFor all four specifications (with and without nonwide and/or H), tunover  is always positive, albeit only
significant in two of the four regression specifications. H isn't always  significant. I use the specification  with both
nonwide  and H.16
4.  Conclusions
The  Czech  and  Slovak  voucher  scheme  led to  more  concentrated  ownership than
expected.  Of  the  shares  offered  through  the  voucher scheme  two-thirds  ended  up  with
investment  funds and one-third with private individuals. And of the shares owned by investment
funds,  72%  is owned by  the top  ten  funds.  Analysis of market prices  suggests two,  not
surprising fimdings:  more concentrated ownership is associated  with higher prices, both for the
last voucher round prices as well as for the secondary market prices; and higher prices are also
associated with high absolute ownership among strategic investors.
The empirical analysis also suggests that controlling  ownership-a relative majority stake
by one strategic investor among all strategic investors-does not lead to higher prices.  This
appears to be associated with low absolute shareholdings.  This is especially relevant for the
investment funds.  While one or two funds often have a controlling stake among all strategic
owners, the absolute amounts of equity held by one or two funds together in a firm are relatively
small, usually less than 25%.  This appears to limit the ability and/or willingness of one (or two
funds together) to make changes in the way firms are managed, thus keeping prices relatively
low.
An important factor which could explain this is the legal system in the Czech and Slovak
Republics. There are certain minimum, absolute majority requirements for important decisions,
which limit the power of owners which have only small absolute ownership stakes.  Important
here may be the proxy voting system.  While it generally depends on a number of factors how
the  proxy  process  finally  affects  corporate  governance, under  certain  systems  minority
shareholders can increase their influence using proxy votes.  But a necessary condition is that
proxy votes can be mobilized.  This is likely not the case in the Czech and Slovak Republics.
This appears to have the effect of shifting power away from strategic shareholders which only
have a minority stake, limiting effective corporate governance. This may explain the lack of a
positive effect of relative controlling ownership on prices.
An alternative explanation is that the funds, which are often managed by banks, face
conflicts of interests and are not necessarily interested in increasing the value of equity alone.
This could explain the result that prices are relatively lower for those firms in which investment
funds have effective control.  This paper did not address the questions whether such type of
"conflicts of interests" hinder or help the restructuring of firms-the  main source  of overall
efficiency gains.  Whether or not policy measures aimed at a strict(-er) separation between the
fund management functions of  a  bank  and  its normal, commercial lending  operations are
required can thus not answered.17
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4, Paris.Table  1: Descriptive 
Statistics (Shares  held by  various Investor  classes) Investor  Cloas 
Mean  Std Dev Minimum Maximum
STATE  8,37%  15.38%  0.00%  84.00%
IDVS  36.53%  21.62% 
1.56%  98.82%
IPFS  39.39%  22.22% 
0.00%  90.89%
DOMINV 
3.25%  12.51%  0.00%  84.00%
FRNGINV 
1.34%  8.00%  0.00%  80.00%
NOTSOLD 
11.12%  10.40%  1.14%  92.83%
TOTAL  100.00% 
NA  NA  NA
Investment  Funds
TOPI  13.42%  6.26%  0.00%  32.44%
TOP2  8.78%  5.60%  0.00%  22.79%
TOPI..2  22.20%  10.86%  0.00%  49.97%
TOP11_1 
38.36%  21.32% 
0.00%  86.52%
Correlation  Matrix
Investor  Class 
STATE  IDVS  IPFS  DOMINV FRNGINV  NOTSOL
STATE 
1.00  -0.40  -0.20  -0.08  -0.03  -0.10
IDVS  -0.40  1.00  -0.51  -0.22  -0.15  -0.00
IPF8  -0.20  -0.51  1.00  -0.24  -0.17  -0.35
oOMINV 
-0.08  -0.22  -0.24 
1.00  -0.03  -0.07
FRNGINV 
-0.03  -0.15  -0.17  -0.03 
1.00  -0.01
NOTSOLD 
-0.10  -0.00  -0.35  -0.07  -0.01  1.00Table  2: Control and Dispersion  Variables
Effective  Contol Vadables  Mean  Std Dev  Number  of Flnns
CONTRLDi  18.31%  38.69%  273
CONTRLD2  49.56%  50.01%  739
CONTRLD3  67.94%  46.69%  1013
CONTROLS  10.19%  30.27%  162
CONTROLD  4.83%  21.44%  72
CONTROLF  1.88%  13.58%  28
RELCTRL  66.53%  47.20%  992
Dispesion Variables  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum
H  13.57%  13.04%  0.10%  86.51%
NONWIDE  51.32%  23.21%  0.01%  93.46%
Correlation  Matrix
Variable  CONTROLS  CONTROLD  CONTROLF  RELCTRL NONWIDE  H
CONTROLS  1.00  -0.08  -0.05  0.24  0.19  0.52
CONTROLD  -0.08  1.00  -0.03  0.16  0.19  0.36
CONTROLF  -0.05  -0.03  1.00  0.10  0.10  0.21
RELCTRL  0.24  0.16  0.10  1.00  -0.42  0.15
NONVADE  0.19  0.19  0.10  -0.42  1.00  0.41
H  0.52  0.36  0.21  0.15  0.41  1.00Table  3: Prices
Prices  (in  logs)
Mean  Std  Dev
Voucher  Price  0.33  1.19
PSE-PrIce  6.16  0.87
RM-Price  5.77  0.83
Correlaon  Matix
Prices  (In  logs)
Voucher  Price  PSE-Price  RM-Price
Voucher  Price  1.00  0.72  0.82
PSE-Prce  0.72  1.00  0.90
RM-Price  0.82  0.90  1.00Table  4: Firm  Variables
Variabe  Mun  Std0ev  CV
OIJTG  1.16  0.49  0.43
BOOKVAL 381348.85  3.26E+12  8543201.33
EMPLO91  842.77  3143674.96  3730.15
FROFrTM  70968.38  4.84E+11  6825446.56
EQU_E.MP  519.78 23917281.02  46014A7
PRO-OUT  0.06  0.12  1.89
EMP_OUT  0.00  0.00  0.01
EMPLO2  3851835.68  1.43E+15  372445796.54
BUNCO  0.19  0.16  0.81
DUmw3  0.06  0.06  0.94
OUMSE  0.09  0.08  0.91
Correlation  Matix
OUTG  BOOKVAL  EMPLO9i  PROFIT91 EQU_EMP  PRO_OUT  EMP_OUT  EMPLO2 DUMCO DUMWB DUMiSE
OUTG  1.00  0.12  n.06  0.12  0.15  0.20  -0.30  0.04  -0.13  0.05  0.02
BOOKVAL  0.12  1.00  0.61  0.92  0.22  0.05  -0.11  0.51  -0.06  -0.01  -0.04
EMPLO91  0.06  0.61  1.00  0.38  0.02  0.04  -0.12  0.84  -0.05  0.00  -0.08
PROFIT91  0.12  0.92  0.38  1.00  0.17  0.07  -0.08  0.31  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01
EQU_EMP  0.15  0.22  0.02  0.17  1.00  -0.05  -0.15  0.03  -0.05  -0.02  0.02
PRO_OUT  0.20  0.05  0.04  0.07  -0.05  1.00  -0.43  0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.00
EMP_OUT  -0.30  -0.11  -0.12  -0.08  -0.15  -0.43  1.00  -0.05  0.07  -0.06  0.22
EMPLO2  0.04  0.51  0.84  0.31  0.03  0.01  -0.05  1.00  -0.03  0.07  -0.02
DUMCO  -0.13  -0.06  -0.05  -0.04  -0.05  -0.01  0.07  -0.03  1.00  0.02  -0.15
OUMMWB  0.05  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.03  -0.06  0.07  0.02  1.00  0.03
DUMSE  0.02  -0.04  -0.08  -0.01  0.02  0.00  0.22  -0.02  -0.15  0.03  1.00Table 5: Baslc  Regressions Result
Voucher-Price  PSE-Price  RM-Price
Usable  aes  1204  DOF  1187  Usable  OBS  287  DOF  280  Usable  OBS  590 DOF  581
R4 *2  0.32  R Bar *2  0.31  R"2  0.36  R  Bar '2  0.35  R"2  0.32  R Bar  "2  0.31
Cooff  T-Stat  Signif  Coeff  T-Stat  SignW  Coeff  T4stat  Signif
Constant  2.17  16.37  0.00  Constant  4.64  32.57  0.00  Constant  4.79  39.33  0.00
OUTO  0.27  3.99  0.00  OUTG  0.42  6.29  0.00  OUTO  0.26  2.48  0.01
OOKVAL  -0.00  -2.50  0.01  DUMCO  0.35  2.94  0.00  EQULEMP -0.00  -2.69  0.01
EMPLO91  -0.00  -6.27  0.00  NONWIDE  1.26  5.55  0.00  DUMSE  0.33  3.15  0.00
PROFITOI  0.00  3.39  0.00  H  0.45  1.29  0.20  DUMWHB 0.29  321  0.00
EQUtEMP  -0.00  -2.36  0.02  DWMINV  1.18  2.23  0.03  H  1.44  4.82  0.00
PRO_0UT  0.33  1.92  0.05  FRNGiNV  1.11  1.86  0.06  NONWIDE  0.64  4.11  0.00
EMP_OUT 44.79  4.16  0.00  DOMINV  1.03  3.39  0.00
EMPLO2  0.00  4.23  0.00  FRNGINV  1.40  3.17  0.00
DUMSE  0.23  2.08  0.04
OUMCO  -0.25  -3.39  0.00
CuMWa  0.51  4.53  0.00
NONWIDE  1.23  7.49  0.00
H  0.13  0.28  0.78
STATES  1.31  4.08  0.00
DOMMIN  1.70  5.43  0.00
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L  of equity
*i- fraction  of firms  -.  VarianceFigure 2  Coefficients  for Absolute Control
(Three  Price  Series)
1.4=
1  -- 2-  ---------------------------------------  --  ---
C1  0  .8  ------  .( 
0  . 223  6  6  6
% of equity
---  PSE-Price  -.-  RM-Price  -i-  Voucher-pricePolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1411 Income Inequality,  Wellare, and  Nanak Kakwani  January 1995  G. Evans
Poverty:  An Illustration  Using  B5783
Ukrainian  Data
WPS1412 Foreign  Technology  Imports  and  Xiaoming  Zhang  January 1995  C. Jones
Economic  Growth  in Developing  Heng-fu  Zou  37754
Countries
WPS1413 Endogenous  Distortions  in Product  Martin  Rama  January 1995  S. Fallon
and Labor Markets  Guido  Tabellini  38009
WPS1414 The  World Bank and  Legal  Technical  The World Bank  January 1995  K. Mathemova
Assistance: Initial Lessons  Legal Department  82782
WPS1415 China's  GDP  in U.S.  Dollars  Based  Ren  Ruoen  January 1995  E.  O'Rielly-Campbell
on Purchasing  Power  Panity  Chen  Kai  33707
WPS1416 Informal Regulation  of Industrial  Sheoli Pargal  February  1995  E. Schaper
Pollution  in Developing  Countries:  David  Wheeler  33457
Evidence  from Indonesia
WPS1417 Uncertainty  and Global  Warming:  An  Andrea  Baranzini  February  1995  C. Del
Option-Pricing  Approach  to Policy  Marc  Chesney  85148
Jacques Morisset
WPS1418 The Impact of Labor  Market  Lyn Squire  February  1995  G. Bayard
Regulations  Sethaput Suthiwart-  37460
Narueput
WPS1419 Industry  Structure  and Regulation  Martin  C. Stewart-Smith  February  1995  N. James
82758
WPS1420 Legislative  Frameworks  Used  to  William  T. Onorato  February  1995  W. Onorato
Foster  Petroleum  Development  81611
WPS1421 Distribution  of Income  and  the Income Zeljko Bogetic  February  1995  F. Smih
Tax Burden  in Bulgaria  Fareed  M. A. Hassan  36072
WPS1422 Efficiency  in Bulgaria's Schools:  Zeljko Bogetic  February  1995  F. Smith
A Nonparametric  Study  Sajal Chattophadyay  36072
WPS1423 The  Role of Commercial  Banks  in  Millard  Long  February  1995  R. Gamer
Enterprise  Restructuring  in Central  Izabela Rutkowska  37670
and Eastem  Europe
WPS1424 Terms-of-Trade  Shocks  and Optimal  Luis Serven  February  1995  E. Khine
Investment:  Another Look at the  37471
Laursen-Metzler  EffectPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1425 On the Intersectoral  Migration of  Donald  Larson  February  1995  J. Jacobson
Agricultural  Labor  Yair Mundlak  33710
WPS1426 Russian Unemployment:  Its  Simon  Commander  Februay 1995  V. Reid
Magnitude,  Characteristics,  and  Ruslan  Yemtsov  35195
Regional  Dimensions
WPS1427 Corporate  Governance  and Equity  Stijn Claessens  February  1995  F. Hatab
Prices:  Evidence  from the Czech  35835
and Slovak Republics